I was about to write an analysis on the obstacles that Abiy Ahmed’s reformism is increasingly facing and the possible choices that he has to overcome them when I came across René Lefort’s latest article on the situation in Ethiopia, “Ethiopia: Climbing Mount Uncertainty.”
On the one hand, I noted that Lefort was raising concerns that are similar to mine, on the other hand, I could not but be intrigued by his confusing and in many ways unsubstantiated analysis of the situation. After struggling for some time, I realized that his analysis makes sense only if one sees the situation from the viewpoint of the TPLF. According to him, Abiy’s reformism is bound to fail and that the only way out is through a return to the hegemonic rule of the past, provided that it corrects some of its glaring mistakes. On top of being surprised that a Western political analyst could recommend a discredited hegemonic rule as a solution to problems arising from the attempt to reform the country, I realized that I could not proceed with my own analysis without showing why Lefort’s doom scenario rests on assumptions that are heavily tinted with biases and unfounded expectations.
Heedless Abiy
To begin with, Lefort seems to have a low opinion of Abiy’s political acumen and ability. He finds that his reforms are “not well thought,” as evidenced by the fact that he invited into the country groups outlawed by the previous government because of their commitment to armed struggle, like the OLF and Ginbot 7. Equally reckless is his haste to sign a peace agreement with Eritrea. More importantly, Abiy’s wanted to reform without having the support of the EPRDF, and especially of the TPLF. Instead, he preferred to rely “on personal charisma and personal popularity,” falsely believing that he could “bypass the EPRDF.” According to Lefort, Abiy has quickly come to the realization of his limitations. That is why, he says, in the last Congress of the party, Abiy was seen “backtracking” toward a position more sympathetic to ethnic parties.
Only time will tell whether Abiy is an able politician and leader or not. However, what we can say for sure is that the accusation that he attempted to sideline the EPRDF, preferring to rely on his charisma and popularity, is a mistaken assertion. If anything, one position that Abiy firmly and consistently held since the beginning of his premiership is his flat rejection of the demand for the formation of a government of transition that would include representatives of opposition political parties. He urged all opposition political parties to prepare themselves for the next election rather than to call for a government of transition. Yet, the demand of opposition leaders had some justification, as they doubted that serious reforms could be undertaken by a coalition of parties that has proven to be undemocratic and self-serving for the past 25 years. Despite Lefort’s assertion, what many observers saw as problematic was not Abiy’s attempt to bypass the EPRDF, but his conviction that he could effect deep changes while using the structure and cadres of the party.
As to the charge of recklessness on the grounds that Abiy invited armed opposition groups and reached peace with the Eritrean leader, it overlooks a number of important factors. It would be inconsistent on the part of Abiy to close the political space for some groups because they opted for armed struggle subsequent to the blockage of all other means of protest. Provided that they renounce the use of arms in favor of peaceful competition, they should be welcomed in the newly opened democratic space. Doubtless, some of these groups may still secretly retain their plan to seize power by means of arms, but until the intention is firmly established any exclusion would be undemocratic. Lefort should know that democracy does not operate with absolute certainty, that it is a risky business involving a constant bet on the prevalence of reason over emotions and extremism. The same can be said concerning peace with Eritrea: the constant stalemate was obviously harmful to both countries. Reason had to prevail and Abiy did what was reasonable, as opposed to the particular interests that some factions had in prolonging the hostility between the two countries. I fail to see in what way peace with Eritrea could be a reckless decision and the continuity of the stalemate a reasonable position.
No Life without the TPLF
The leitmotif of Lefort’s analysis is the deterioration of social peace and stability since the political and economic hegemony of the TPLF has been curtailed. According to him, nowhere is the recklessness of Abiy’s reforms more manifest than in the chaos that resulted in all the echelons of the state apparatus. Without fear of exaggeration, he says: “the state has collapsed. The top-down lines of authority have vanished. There is no respect, no fear. The power vacuum is abyssal.” While I was reading this wild tirade, I thought for a moment that he was referring to another country. Be that as it may, the crux of his argument is that this chaos occurred because Abiy wanted to implement reforms without the support of the TPLF. And as Lefort sees it, the truth about Ethiopia is that neither the EPRDF nor the Ethiopian state can function without the guidance and the authority of the TPLF. He writes this about the possibility of reform: “Only a strong EPRDF leadership with an affirmed vision can give it impetus and direction. Having enjoyed hegemony for more than two decades, the TPLF had more than enough time to become the backbone not only of the party but also of the state.”
What is baffling here is that Lefort blames Abiy for ethnic conflicts, displacements, and various local disruptions, but says nothing about those who are causing these crimes and disturbances in the hope of undermining the reforms. In his eyes, the reason that prevents the state from functioning is not “sabotage” but “simple passivity, an attitude of ‘wait and see.’” The explanation is designed to take the blame away from the TPLF and the remnants of the old guard. The state does not work, not because of internal oppositions to reforms, but because its head, namely, the TPLF has been cut off. Without the TPLF, the EPRDF is blind and ineffective. Be it noted, also, that Lefort never says that these reforms are necessary and that those opposing them are on the wrong side. The culprit is Abiy with his policy to curb the hegemony of the TPLF. His imprudence lies in his inability to understand that the only force able to keep Ethiopia working and united is the TPLF.
Instead of appreciating the relative peace after such dramatic changes, Lefort’s concern for peace is at best short-sighted, all the more so as he admits that “day-to-day life carries on in relative peace in large parts of the country.” Who on earth would expect to see deep changes occurring without some measure of social disturbance? Ethnic clashes and displacements were all the more inevitable as Abiy’s inherited a state in complete disarray as a result of prolonged and incessant uprisings in various parts of the country. The idea that Abiy wrecked a party and a state machinery that were functional is anything but true. And what ruined the party and the state was none other than the hegemonic rule of the TPLF. It is disconcerting to see a veteran student of Ethiopian politics promoting the previous ill of the country to the level of a remedy. To quote him, “a state apparatus with a venerable tradition of strictly hierarchical operation has broken down for lack of a strong command post.”
The Specter of Amhara Nationalism
Lefort begins with a true factual statement, namely, that the alliance between the Amhara and Oromo wings of the EPRDF made possible Abiy’s election to premiership. Very quickly, however, he drifts into an assertion that at least deserves some qualification, which is that “the tactical alliance with the ODP to oust the TPLF, imposed at the very apex – the so-called ‘Oromara’” has evaporated, the reason being that the ADP has espoused “ultranationalist and even aggressive positions.” We recognize here some echo of the long-standing position of the TPLF towards the Amhara. ADP has become ultranationalist and aggressive because it took some measures to assert its independence and, most of all, because it started to claim territories that were unjustly incorporated into the Tigray region. If those leading the TPLF have ever caressed the idea that the Amhara will renounce their right to the annexed territories, they were nothing less than delusional.
As an observer of political realities, Lefort knows that conflicts resulting from forceful incorporations of territories will not go away. His aim in characterizing legitimate claims as ultra-nationalism is to raise the specter of Amara expansionism so as break up the unity between ODP and ADP. It goes without saying that the main beneficiary of the breakup will be the TPLF. In this way, Ethiopia reverses course and goes back to the original position of the TPLF, which is to guarantee the perpetuation of its hegemony by fomenting a lasting hostility between the Oromo and the Amhara.
As Lefort sees it, the solution to the leadership crisis responsible for the unrests and conflicts “engulfing” the country is an alliance between the ODP and the TPLF against the Amhara. He thus revives Meles’s old doctrine by stating that, as a result of the resurgence of Amhara nationalism, “both Oromo and Tigrayans again see a common threat emanating from the Amhara region.” This “holy alliance” against the Amhara could be “reinforced by the support of some Southerners, particularly the Sidama, and by the peripheral affiliated structures.” In other words, everybody is ready to form a strong party alliance that would provide the necessary leadership except the Amhara. The latter are the spoilers of the peaceful integration of peoples under the constructive guidance of the TPLF. Lefort finds evidence of the emergence of this anti-Amhara alliance in the fact that in the last Congress “Abiy Ahmed systematically censured criticisms of the TPLF, particularly by the ADP.”
Now it does not require an exceptional insight to admit that the Amhara claim of annexed territories, however legitimate it may be, cannot be solved without igniting war with the region of Tigray. No less obvious is the fact that, under the present conditions, the federal government is in no position to implement whatever decision it may take to right the wrong that was done. This does not mean that the Amhara should stop making the claims, but simply that they should wait until such times conditions allow a peaceful or imposed resolution of the issue, which issue is truly turning into one of the thorniest problems of the country. Clearly, in singling out the Amhara, and not the TPLF, as the problem child of Ethiopia, Lefort does no more than echo the textbook belief of the TPLF.
What Remains after the Screening?
Once partisanship and skewed analyses are removed, there remains the core issue, which is that, as Lefort puts it, “Abiy does not have the structured political power base commensurate with his function”––I add, with his function as reformer. This fault line is a reality that Abiy himself acknowledged in one of his recent speeches. He even mentioned one of the options opened to him, namely, the recourse to an authoritarian style of government. But he quickly dismisses it, arguing, correctly, that the method will put him right back where the two previous governments were. On the other hand, we noted that, contrary to Lefort’s allegation, Abiy does not intend to marginalize the EPRDF and rely on his sole popularity. Such a choice would land him where he does not want to go, to wit, dictatorship,
To the extent that the will to reform means nothing unless it is backed by a reliable and significant political force and succeeds in being institutionalized, one must concede that the troubles of the country are nowhere near to being resolved, as witnessed by the recent event of armed soldiers entering the vicinities of the Palace. All the more reason to say so is that Abiy himself knows that the EPRDF machinery is not fully on board with his reformist agenda. Yet, despite this resistance, which, by the way, is unsurprising, Abiy seems to be determined to push reforms through a machinery that is not fully cooperative.
Does this means that the reforms are doomed to fail and that to have any chance of success Abiy must restitute the alignment of forces as it existed prior to his election, notably by giving the TPLF the prevalent position it had, as Lefort claims? Or does it require that Abiy change his previous stand and constitute a government of transition by inviting opposition forces, as suggested by some leaders of the opposition? The first option makes little sense because it asks Abiy to agree to play a role similar to the previous Prime Minister, Haile Mariam Dessalegn, while the TPLF governs from behind the scenes. Lefort promises that things will be different this time, given that the TPLF has made its own self-criticism and is ready to give up its hegemonic tendency by its “commitment to a soft landing from the summit to a more rational position.” This promise reminds Ethiopians the saying, “fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.” Let there be no doubt that, after 25 years of brutal rule, for Ethiopians one thing is indisputable about the TPLF: a leopard never changes its spots.
The second option, namely, a government of coalition with opposition forces, is little realistic and, what is more, unable to solve the problems the country is facing. In light of the proliferation of ethnonationalist groups, the sidelining of the EPRDF will only give them a free reign to ignite chaos and the possibility of civil wars. None of the opposition groups is at the present strong enough to make a significant contribution in the resolution of the problems. Or else, if they have appreciable followers, many of them are so impregnated with ethnonationalist ideologies that they will worsen the problem instead of helping to solve it. Put otherwise, by sidelining the EPRDF, Abiy gets nothing in return, nay, aggravates the problems by weakening his hand further.
What this means is that reforms must, willy-nilly, occur and continue through the instrumentality of the EPRDF for the foreseeable future. The EPRDF is the only path toward maintaining the unity of the country and consolidating it by means of democratic reforms. As to the objection according to which the EPRDF is unfit for the implementation of real and far-reaching reforms, the answer must be that one must see things in their movement rather than in their fixity. For one thing, reformers of the caliber of Abiy and Lemma Megersa came out from the EPRDF and there is no reason to assume that, given time, more reformers would not follow suit within the ODP and the other associated parties. For another, the strength of the reformers is likely to grow as Abiy vigorously pushes for the renewal of cadres at the various levels of the party. And this seems to be what Abiy is trying to achieve: beyond verbal commitments to reform, he wants to gradually fashion the party by renewing its personnel and outlook.
Given time, the more the reforms take root, the more the intensity of the problems will decrease, especially those associated with the TPLF’s obsession to regain its hegemonic position. Lefort hails the fact that in Tigray “the fusion between the Front and the population is now almost total. Tigray is the only region that remains globally calm, probably the only one where the local authorities are not contested and are even respected.” There is no doubt in my mind that this calm and deference to the TPLF point to the silence and fear of repression. As reforms gain ground in the rest of Ethiopia, they will disturb the political calm of Tigray, with Tigreans wondering why freedom and democracy should stop at the borders of their region.
If, indeed, Tigreans finally decide to engage in the battle for democracy, favorable conditions could emerge for the peaceful resolution of their conflicts with the Amhara region. In a word, Tigreans have the choice between defending the expansionist policy of the TPLF, with the consequence that they will never free themselves from its authoritarian rule, or abandon expansion in favor of democracy, whose great reward is the possibility of a lasting peace with the Amhara and all the benefits that accrue from it.
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Dear Dr. Messay,
allow me to congratulate you for this analysis. I had similar difficulties with René Lefort’s article. I used to appreciate much of his previous work and insight into Ethiopian society and poliitics – and can only speculate what leads him, to my understanding, a little bit off track this time around. It might be his long-standing contacts with leading figures of TPLF’s “old guard”. From my own experience, I know how easy it is as an outsider to get intrigued when such insiders make you feel they trust you and let you have a feel of what is really happening. EPLF, TPLF, REST and others developed an expertise in that kind of “baiting” during the time of cross-border operations from Eastern Sudan (where I worked at the time with the Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees) into their liberated areas. They used to take selected confidants inside, trying to secure their continuous admiration. I am not aware about the origin and precise nature of René Lefort’s connections, but he himself hints to (previously?) influential sources close to the center. I think it’s possible that he got a little carried away by some sort of mechanism of that kind.
Concerning your own argument, I couldn’t agree more with: “(…) reforms must, willy-nilly, occur and continue through the instrumentality of the EPRDF for the foreseeable future. The EPRDF is the only path toward maintaining the unity of the country and consolidating it by means of democratic reforms. (…) Given time, the more the reforms take root, the more the intensity of the problems will decrease, especially those associated with the TPLF’s obsession to regain its hegemonic position.” I am fairly confident that this will happen. And speaking of “hegemony” – I think the key is that Abiy and his youthful cohort of reformers (including a few elderly allies) have gained hegemony within EPRDF (and even activated the hitherto marginalized coalition partners from the lowland peripheries) because they were able to read the signs of the time way ahead of the old guard.
By the way: have you given up on the idea of a government of national unity? Haven’t I read a piece of yours in favour of it not so long ago? Anyway, I think it wouldn’t be feasible, in fact it would increase the risk of disorder und malfunctioning in the party-state-security machinery, precisely because it would alienate too many in the EPRDF.
Thanks for your valuable contributions and best wishes,
Klaus Schmitt
(member of the German-Ethiopian Association,
professionally and privately engaged in/with developments in Ethiopia since the mid-1980s)
Dear Klaus,
The following have fallen for Tplf “baiting.” Jonathan Dimbleby, Bob Geldof (now owns Awash winery courtesy of Tplf; Geldof calls it “trade” instead of “greed”); Gayle Smith at USAID; Alex de Waal at Peace Foundation/Meles Zenawi Foundation; Tony Blair (later distanced himself from Meles Zenawi); Senator Inhofe (a fundamentalist evangelical and anti-Islam, Tplf “key” to getting rid of “terrorists”); Jo Stiglitz at Columbia (believed Meles was uncorrupt; Jo was pushed out the World Bank and he was the one who endorsed “developmental state” which led to the de-registration of civil societies); Bill Gates (has money and a dream of stopping Africans ‘having children like rabbits’ and swamping Europe/an culture); and so on. How did Tplf do all this in broad daylight? For the likes of de Waal and Geldof, Tplf played on them reliving their dreams of a successful revolution (de Waal still addresses Meles as “comrade”). Secondly, Tplf paid an American PR firm millions per year to keep seducing lazy and greedy western policy makers. Can you imagine a bright fellow like Obama visit Ethiopia and declare it “a democratically elected government?” How did that happen? Easy. Obama being a narcissist Ethiopian leaders pointed to a glorious rainbow when his plane touched down (interpreted as Obama is a Man of Peace). Only the rainbow was visible the following days and the days before Obama arrived! You sure have identified Lefort is suffering from a similar ailment!
I started reading the article with the hope that the professor will provide a critical analyses. But he concluded by threatening the Tigreans unless they መደመር , blaming TPLF as expansionist. At the end I knew I wasted my time.
Dr. Messay is on point in his counter arguement. While I fully support democratization process under Abiye/EPRDF tutelage, I am also feeling less comfortable with the assumption that Abiye will continue to have the popularity and alliance he enjoyed six months ago to finish the job. For one, it’s impossible to keep people at heightened level of euphoria for there is fatigue factor. Secondly, More importantly, Abiye is losing critical support from sectors that do not fancy his criterion in filling ministerial portfolios. Third, people are beginning to doubt his power as he failed to stop lawlessness rages in many parts of the country.
I look forward to Dr. Messay’s next essay on what can be done under the circumstances.
Believe or not evey body follows the Ethiopian situation.so, what the professor concluded is better.
1. EPRDF is dead for sure.
2. His views on ANDM is correct
3. Abyi is now rethinking what mistakenly did before especially, he is negotiating with TPLF/OLF.
Lefort has a definite view points on the current PM and country in general. From all appearances that he knew far little about too much of Abiy and non-Tigryans. one doesn’t know on what ground he has based his “expertise”. One gets unwarranted impression TPLF must have paid him a lot for his efforts to make that kind of inane political screed. I find like so many Ethiopians this kind of sleaze PR spin sickening.
Some foreign self-proclaimed analysts such as Rene Lefort, deliberately or not try to present TPLF as champion of federalism. The truth is the long Ethiopian history show the Amhara and Tigreans have not much a difference in their agenda towards what Donald Levine described the Greater Ethiopia. Both have been competing for dominance and power, they rally other ethnic groups towards that goal. The Tigreans have been using this ethnic federalism to dominate the country in the past three decades. Please, Rene Lefort stop the nonsense.
Good that we have Messay Kebede for saying what we had all in mind.
This article is weak because it’s totally reliant on criticizing Lacroft’s theory. And the last part of this article is so tthreatening to Tigray people. If they don’t start opposing tplf and give up the territories to Amhara they won’t be beneficial from the region anymore.I didn’t expect this from a scholar like you. I guess you can’t change the spot of a leopard like you said. Anyway the hegemony of Tplf is over, and they themselves know it. What I think Lacroft is saying is at least for the time being include the helping hands of the tplf for their experience in the state apparatus. That foreigner is more far sighted than most Ethiopian scholars who are still shackled by their ethnic affiliations
“Anyway the hegemony of Tplf is over, and they themselves know it.” Really, Mr Biniz? Are you really sure? Do you know about the composition of the Ethiopian army, at the top, at least? Who is in charge of those military regional commands? The Tigreans. Who runs and controls the business in Ethiopia? The Tigreans. How do you argue then for passing of their dominance? Of course, you are repeating what most are saying, without proof on the ground.
That’s why I said lacroft is right. You just can’t get rid of them within a blink of an eye. It takes time to remove their influence. Even if most of them stole there are some left there who are still good Ethiopians like team lemma. At least they look like good Ethiopians for now. Anyway let’s find something to work with because we got millions of reasons to fight with. And it won’t get us far like that.
And these Tigreans you claim to be controlling the economy are most probably affiliated with tplf. The other 95 % of Tigray is still poor. Don’t forget in the article Tigray is the 8th poorest state from the 9
You mean also the likes of TPLF’s Getachew Assefa should be allowed to continue terrorizing and massacring people in all parts of the country? In Afar, Gambealla, Benshangual, Harar, Raya like they are doing now? You have a very acute sense of justice.
No not at all. He should at least be far from the political position he have been given. And don’t judge? Just forward for opinion like a literate person
Biniz is of course speaking for Tplf.
Let’s be honest here. I’m not a supporter nor a member of Tplf.Im just an honest Ethiopian trying to be non biased so that our country could prosper. You should be ashamed for categorizing a person just because he/she don’t line up with your view. Kiros you know who I’m talking about
Professor Messay,
I think your critique is in the main salient. But I think it overstates Lefort’s seeming sympathies with the TPLF. Lefort openly accuses the TPLF of being willing to die on a hill in trying to force Abiy to adhere to an ill-defined, empty ideology (revolutionary democracy) and anachronistic Marxist modes of governance (democratic centralism), enriching themselves through rank, oligarchic cronyism that has, in itself, done little to improve the lot of ordinary Tigrayans, and keeping their assets outside of the region. (And by doing so, I’d add, making their co-ethnics the target of resentment and open violence from other Ethiopians.) This is hardly a favorable assessment.
But I do agree Lefort seems limited in seeing the revitalization of the “party-state” as the only (medium-term?) path to stability. Why not, at least, separating the party from the state and strengthening the latter? Why emphasize an ODP-TPLF pact rather than a deepening of the existing ODP-ADP one?
We need this kind of argument all the time because this is how we can support democratization process , our homeland Ethiopia. I am also feeling less comfortable that we should not ashamed categorizing a person just because he/she does not support article.
Rene’s article, the response by Messay and the comments expressed here, exemplify some of the problems associated with analysis and commentary on the current political situation in Ethiopia. I will keep my comments brief/succinct as I think there are certain points especially in terms of the reactions to Rene’s article that are problematic and tend to cloud objective analysis;
The tendency to always deny the validity of criticisms against the current administration in Ethiopia and to dismiss such analysis and perspectives by immediately ascribing ulterior political motives only serves to distort analysis but may also distort responses and actions to remedy the situation. This has become quite a common pattern and the comments and reactions to Rene’s piece perfectly reflect this ostrich like attitude/tendency.
Rene is a long time student and observer of Ethiopian politics since the 70s (for those of you who are unaware, he is also the author of ”Ethiopia: An Heretical Revolution”). His more recent works are also extremely perceptive and grounded (articles on rural kebeles in north Shoa-Amhara region, and the dynamics around national elections and shifts in rural/agrarian development policies and reliant on field work lasting months in rural Ethiopia). He was also deported late in 2017 from Ethiopia due to the critical pieces he was writing the then protests and government reactions. I raise all these points as evidence to argue that Rene is very far from a pro-government/ruling party hack unlike the accusations brought up here.
Again for those of you who may be unaware of this, Messay point that Rene’s analysis is ”unsubstantiated” is ironic. Prof./Dr. Messay by background is a philosopher (i.e. the humanities and not a social scientist), based in the USA for over 20 years or so, and has yet to return back, and his analysis of political realities Ethiopia is invariably refracted by distance (plus second hand information/data? relayed through different types of media and second hand testimony).
Coming to Rene’s piece and the reactions by Messay, Rene’s piece due to its pragmatic tone/recommendations and because the author has attempted to foreground TPLF concerns, doesn’t necessarily translate to support and bias in favor of the former powers that be. That distinction has to be understood.
Much of the analysis and the conclusions that Rene brings up are very obvious to anyone that lives here in Ethiopia and has an above-average interest in Ethiopian politics (past and current). The power vacuum-paralysis of large sectors of the state apparatus, the impotence of the security apparatus, the breakdown in central control over large areas in Oromia and Amhara, the upsurge in ethnic tensions, conflicts and displacements, are all undeniable, lived realities for us here in Ethiopia. Even Rene’s explanation/hypothesis regarding this, i.e. the fusion of party, government and security institutions in the past and its breakdown as explaining the above developments-is convincing as anyone who has more than a cursory acquaintance with the modus operandi of the Ethiopian state in the past 27 years can attest to. Rene’s point that in spite the undeniable problems/weaknesses of this system (extreme centralization/concentration of power at the center, authoritarianism, tendencies of ethnocratic patterns of power and wealth accumulation etc) that it had certain achievements to its credit, is also clear.
Rene also rightly points out that many of the most important decisions and actions by the current administration have occurred in the absence of the consultations and consensus within the ruling party. His point that some of these decisions were taken in a hurried manner and then the party, sections of the state apparatus and the general public-were presented with successive fait accomplis is just a matter of fact and not conjecture. This is especially the case for the decisions regarding rapprochement with Eritrea, the decisions to welcome back political groups in exile and the decision on large scale privatizations.
Rene’s scenarios and suggestions regarding how the transition can be handled in a way that is less disruptive and destabilizing, may strike some people as too sympathetic to the old EPRDF and TPLF. But from where I’m standing the worst that Rene can be accused of is being too pragmatic. But that said, if one put emotions and biases aside, who would deny that the ruling party is and has to play a leading role in the current transition? This is a point that Messay himself in his response, seems to implicitly accept. And if this is valid, then it naturally follows that the current transition will only benefit from the inclusion of the TPLF, the oldest and the strongest component of the current EPRDF.
Sometimes it seems there is a concerted effort on the part of some Diaspora Ethiopians and some foreigners to consistently downplay or deny the scope of the current crisis in Ethiopia.
Dear Hoonfey,
Thanks for letting us know about the book Rene Lefort has already written. We also know he is writing another book about the current Ethiopian politics that he started some three years ago. Only that Abiy Ahmed is destroying his theory with all the dramatic changes he is undertaking in the country. Party of the reason why Rene is pissed off with Abiy Ahmed. Well, I don’t think Abiy can do anything about it. Come to terms with it and change the content of the book. This commentator also try to convince us Rene lefort went to Ethiopia recently. So he has a right to make a conclusion that is politically charged and baseless. Probably you could yourself question if Lefort has not uncritically believed his informants, most of them are apparently TPLF members. No need to compare Messay and Lefort about their knowledge of Ethiopian politics. One doesn’t speak of the local language to understand what is happening.
To Hoonfey:
I thank you for your comments. I see now one or two things I could have said differently. That said, I am surprised that you use my not being in the country as an argument against the article. In case you forget, in this digital era the world has become a village so that one can be well informed about a place without being physically present there. On the other hand, you may be too close to the situation and unable to see the forest for the trees. You may need to step back to see the big picture, which, I agree, requires a philosophic mind. By the way, in many of his articles, Lefort admits that he uses information supplied by senior members of the TPLF. Also, I would point out that TPLF led previous governments have repeatedly tried to effect a “rapprochement” with Eritrea without any success. They have also tried to negotiate with the OLF. Do these attempts become reckless only when Abiy takes them up and, what is more, succeeds?
Messay
Here you go:
https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2018/10/29/rene-lefort-a-seven-point-response-to-messay-kebedes-critique/